Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological Building on and extending Fodor’s earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat of. Mind. ( hence. RTM. ; for discussion see., among other sources.,. Fodor.,. FA. ; Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of. Mind Jerry Fodor, as the leading philosophical exponent of cognitive science, has sparked.

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I, too, am not a Rutgers, Fodor, Dretske, etc. Another kind of problem is that a teleosemantic theory assigns the wrong content. Philosophical Review, pages —99, I should have been clearer about that. It might use something much simpler like the spike rate or count because such things can more readily influence downstream neuronal networks. But they are extremely sensitive to reward, pwychosemantics to motivate by depriving them of food or water, and become amazing operant learners.

Psychosemantics Quotes

About that, I am not sure of the weight one should give to the animal communication literature, when it comes to content attributions to animal mental states. I wonder how crucial that is in the rat…. I take it that your argument goes something like this: Psyfhosemantics am not sure there is anything like conditional reasoning in rats demonstrated in a compelling way.

That seems to me to be a pretty safe premise. When precision matters, we calibrate with one another. Your stuff is always quite interesting.


My point was that none of the naturalistic paychosemantics on offer — specifically, versions of information-theoretic and teleological semantics — suffice to pick out fine-grained, determinate content of the sort we assume mental representation requires.

The focus on what you call perception, both in your comments and in much contemporary neuroscience has advantages, but also drawbacks. You seem just to be stipulating, contra Millikan, that we should consider only the producer side.

This gives rise to content ascriptions that play pshchosemantics role in explanation.

This langauge I think was originally from Sejnowski. For that is the only thing that corresponds by a compositional rule to it, the absence of which would matter-the absence of which would disrupt the function of those mechanisms osychosemantics rely on the magnetosome for guidance.

For those that think informational approaches are doomed, what is the reasonable alternative? That seems to be a dominant view in the philosophy of language and mind. Thinking of them informationally helps explain their behavioral accuracy and orients our thinking about what features of the neuronal spike trains to look at as potentially causally potent for downstream neurons e.

As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. By contrast, relatively little progress if any at all has come from armchair speculation. Does Semantics Run the Psyche? I just think that most of the relevant functions will be outside-world directed.

History of Western Philosophy. But you are right, we are still not looking much at connections among mental states. Moving black ball is as much a whole object as is a fly, right? They tend to reject things whole cloth rather than use the obvious good ideas and supplement them. These are the sorts of details for this case that are psychosemntics.


Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers

To the extent that teleosemantic approaches meet this holistic constraint, I think they have a better chance. My graduate work addressed the fact that leech sensory neuron spike timing carries a great deal of information about touch location.

On this point, I have to part ways with Robert Brandom. Is that an example of content being influenced by other mental states? What I am suggesting is that the relation of teleosemantics with ethology it is not as analogous to, say, the philosophy of time with fundamental physics as one may think. I am grateful for the link to the PDF file. The Quinean indeterminacy issues will arise for these language-like states just as easily as they do for the speech acts of adult human beings.

Was Psychosemantics a Failure?

PGS writes great stuff! This strikes me as being the wrong way to proceed. Comments gratefully received… http: